Did State Actors Create Hamas, Iran’s Ayatollah, and Castro’s Cuba? A Capitalist Analysis

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By @greywarden100
Published: June 25, 2025

Image Source: https://meforum.org/how-iran-abandoned-fatah-in-favor-of-hamas

The assertion that Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency financed and created Hamas has generated significant discussion, appearing frequently in online forums and public discourse. [9] Additional claims allege that Israel and Mossad supported the establishment of Iran’s Ayatollah regime in 1979, that the CIA installed Fidel Castro in Cuba, that the United States under President Jimmy Carter facilitated the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, and that governments deliberately foster radical regimes to perpetuate global instability. [9, 15] As @greywarden100, I have examined historical records, credible sources, and public sentiment to evaluate these claims. From a Capitalist perspective, which prioritizes individual liberty and market-driven solutions over state intervention, these allegations reflect the unintended consequences of government overreach rather than deliberate conspiracies. [7] This analysis provides an evidence-based assessment, supported by rigorous sourcing.

Historical Context: Hamas’s Origins and Israel’s Strategy

In the 1970s and 1980s, Gaza was marked by intense political tension. Hamas, formally the Islamic Resistance Movement, emerged in 1987 during the First Intifada, a widespread Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation. [4] Its origins trace to Mujama al-Islamiya, a charitable organization founded in 1973 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. [4] Mujama al-Islamiya focused on providing social services, including schools, clinics, and mosques, thereby gaining significant local support. [2]

During this period, Israel’s primary adversary was the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), led by Yasser Arafat, which advocated for a Palestinian state and employed militant tactics. [4] To counter the PLO’s influence, Israeli authorities adopted a strategy of supporting religious organizations like Mujama, perceived as less threatening due to their focus on charity rather than armed resistance. [2] This approach, rooted in state intervention, would later prove to be a significant miscalculation. [7]

Evidence Supporting the Claim of Israeli Involvement

Several credible sources, including statements from former Israeli officials, suggest that Israel indirectly supported the precursors to Hamas as a counterweight to the PLO. The following evidence outlines this involvement:

1. Israeli Support for Mujama al-Islamiya

  • Brigadier General Yitzhak Segev, Israel’s military governor of Gaza in the early 1980s, acknowledged in an interview with The New York Times that Israel provided financial support to Islamic institutions, including Mujama al-Islamiya, to undermine the PLO’s influence. [3]
  • Avner Cohen, Israel’s religious affairs official in Gaza during Hamas’s formative years, stated in a 2009 Wall Street Journal article, “Hamas, to my great regret, is Israel’s creation.” [1] Cohen explained that Israel collaborated with Yassin’s organization to counter the PLO’s secular nationalism, permitting Mujama to expand its network of social services without significant oversight. [1]
  • Israeli authorities granted permits to Mujama al-Islamiya throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, enabling its charitable activities to flourish. [2] This tolerance persisted until 1989, when Hamas began targeting Israeli civilians and soldiers, prompting a crackdown. [2] A 2018 The Intercept report details how this early support laid the groundwork for Hamas’s emergence. [2]

2. Strategic Divide-and-Rule Approach

  • Israeli officials believed that fostering Islamist groups could fragment Palestinian unity, thereby weakening the PLO. [2] In 2015, Bezalel Smotrich, a far-left statist politician whose advocacy for state control aligns with collectivist ideologies, described the Palestinian Authority as a “burden” and Hamas as an “asset” for undermining Palestinian legitimacy on the international stage. [2]
  • Feyzi İşbaşaran, a Turkish lawmaker, claimed in 1998 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu encouraged Turkey to support Hamas to counter Palestinian secularists. [2] While unverified, this allegation aligns with Israel’s broader strategy of leveraging divisions among Palestinian factions. [2]

3. Qatari Funding with Israeli Approval

  • From 2018, Israel permitted millions of dollars in Qatari funds to enter Gaza to stabilize the region and prevent humanitarian collapse. [3] A 2023 New York Times investigation reported that Qatar delivered billions over a decade, with Netanyahu’s approval. [3] Mossad chief David Barnea confirmed Israel’s endorsement of these transfers to Qatari officials prior to Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack. [3]
  • Critics, including former National Security Adviser Eyal Hulata, warned that some of these funds were diverted to Hamas’s military wing, a concern echoed in Mossad intelligence assessments. [3] EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell claimed in January 2024 that Israel “financed the creation of Hamas” to weaken the Palestinian Authority, though he provided no evidence beyond the Qatari funding. [3]

4. Public Sentiment on Social Media

  • Discussions on X reveal a range of perspectives, with some users asserting that Israel played a role in Hamas’s rise, suggesting that Mossad supported Hamas’s precursors in the 1980s to divide Palestinian factions. [9] Others argue that Israel’s financial involvement was limited to allowing Qatari funds to reach Gaza for humanitarian purposes. [9] These online debates, while not primary evidence, underscore the claim’s prominence in public discourse. [9]

Counterarguments and Denials

Despite the evidence above, several counterarguments challenge the notion that Mossad directly created or financed Hamas:

1. Distinction Between Mujama and Hamas

  • Critics, such as HonestReporting on X, argue that Israel supported Mujama al-Islamiya’s charitable activities, not Hamas’s militant operations. [9] When Yassin shifted to armed resistance in 1987, Israeli authorities were unprepared for this development. [2]
  • Shalom Harari, a former Israeli military intelligence officer, stated, “Israel never financed Hamas. Israel never armed Hamas.” [2] He attributed Hamas’s rise to governmental oversight failures rather than a deliberate strategy. [2]

2. Netanyahu’s Position

  • Following the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denied facilitating Hamas’s financing, asserting that Qatari funds were intended to prevent humanitarian collapse in Gaza, not to empower Hamas. [3] Some voices on X have echoed this view, emphasizing that Israel permitted Qatari money to maintain stability and reduce violence. [9]

3. Hamas’s Independent Funding Sources

  • Hamas has secured substantial funding from international sources, including Iran, which provided $30 million annually through Hezbollah by the late 2000s, and Qatar, which pledged $30 million monthly since 2014 for Gaza’s infrastructure and salaries. [6] Additional support comes from Turkey and private Gulf donors. [6] Hamas also employs cryptocurrencies and smuggling to circumvent sanctions, demonstrating financial independence. [6] A 2021 Reuters report details these diverse funding streams. [6]

4. Unintended Consequences of Policy

  • Some analysts argue that Israel’s support for Mujama al-Islamiya was a strategic error, not a deliberate effort to create Hamas. [7] David Hacham, a former Israeli military expert in Gaza, reflected, “When I look back, I think we made a mistake,” acknowledging that officials underestimated the potential for Islamist militancy. [7] A 2006 Washington Post article likened Hamas to “Israel’s Taliban,” a group initially supported to counter the PLO but which later became a significant threat, illustrating the unintended consequences of state intervention. [7]

Addressing Misconceptions

Certain claims extend beyond the Hamas narrative, alleging that Israel and Mossad established Iran’s Ayatollah regime in 1979, that the CIA installed Fidel Castro in Cuba, that the United States under Jimmy Carter facilitated the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, and that governments intentionally create radical regimes to foster global instability. [9, 15] From a Capitalist perspective, these assertions reflect the pitfalls of excessive state intervention rather than orchestrated conspiracies. [7] The following refutations and analyses are grounded in evidence.

1. Did Israel and Mossad Establish Iran’s Ayatollah Regime?

  • The Claim: Some assert that Israel and Mossad supported Ayatollah Khomeini’s rise to power in 1979. [9]
  • The Refutation: This claim lacks credible evidence. The Iranian Revolution was a domestic movement driven by economic hardship, political repression under the Shah, and Khomeini’s religious influence. [5] Israel maintained a strategic alliance with the Shah’s regime, which supplied oil and collaborated against shared regional adversaries. [5] Supporting Khomeini, who later called for Israel’s destruction, would have been contrary to Israel’s interests. [5] The Council on Foreign Relations (2023) provides a detailed account of the revolution’s internal dynamics, with no mention of Israeli involvement. [5]

2. Did the CIA Install Fidel Castro?

  • The Claim: It is alleged that the CIA placed Fidel Castro in power in Cuba. [9]
  • The Refutation: This is historically inaccurate. The CIA supported the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion to overthrow Castro after he aligned with the Soviet Union. [8] While the U.S. initially tolerated Castro’s 1959 revolution due to its opposition to the Batista regime, it quickly opposed his government upon its shift toward communism. [8] Declassified CIA documents from the 1960s confirm efforts to destabilize Castro, not install him. [8]

3. Did the United States Install Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979?

  • The Claim: Some assert that the United States, under President Jimmy Carter and the CIA, financed and facilitated Ayatollah Khomeini’s rise, removing the Persian Monarchy and leading to an Islamic regime that many Iranians now regret. [15]

  • The Evidence and Analysis: The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was primarily a domestic uprising against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, fueled by widespread discontent over corruption, repression by the SAVAK secret police, and economic inequality. [5, 12] However, declassified U.S. documents reveal that the Carter administration had extensive contacts with Khomeini’s entourage before his return to Iran, raising questions about U.S. involvement. [10, 11]

    • U.S. Contacts with Khomeini: In January 1979, Khomeini, exiled in Paris, sent messages to the Carter administration through intermediaries like Ebrahim Yazdi, an Iranian-American advisor. [10] Khomeini proposed a deal: if Carter influenced the Iranian military to avoid a coup and allow his takeover, he would ensure stability and protect U.S. interests, including oil. [10] U.S. emissaries, such as Warren Zimmermann, met with Yazdi to clarify that the U.S. would not support a sudden return that could provoke military backlash. [10] A 2016 BBC News report, based on declassified cables, suggests Carter’s administration discouraged the Iranian military from launching a coup against Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar, who was attempting to preserve the monarchy. [10]

    • Carter’s Policy Shift: Carter’s human rights policy, which threatened to withhold arms from regimes violating human rights, weakened U.S. support for the Shah, emboldening Iranian dissidents. [12, 14] By November 1978, U.S. Ambassador William Sullivan reported to Washington that the Shah’s regime was “doomed” and suggested facilitating an agreement between junior military commanders and Khomeini. [10] In January 1979, General Robert E. Huyser was sent to Tehran to dissuade the military from staging a coup, signaling U.S. acceptance of the Shah’s departure. [10, 11] On February 1, 1979, Khomeini returned to Tehran, and by February 11, the military declared neutrality, effectively surrendering to the revolutionaries. [12]

    • Allegations of Financing: Some posts on X claim Carter provided $150 million to Khomeini to secure his return, but no credible evidence supports this. [15] A 1980 CIA analysis indicates Khomeini reached out to the U.S. as early as 1963, expressing willingness to protect American interests, but it does not confirm direct financing. [11] Iranian leaders, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have dismissed these reports as based on “fabricated documents.” [11]

Image Source: https://x.com/NiohBerg/status/1937112487020912888?t=7GZbgG64wjK5CxeCOlQmZw&s=19

  • Public Regret and Monarchist Sentiment: Many Iranians today express regret over the Islamic Republic, citing its repression of human rights, discrimination against minorities, and economic mismanagement. [13, 15] The United States Department of State (2020) notes that the regime’s brutality and sponsorship of terrorism have alienated citizens, with protests demanding reform or regime change. [13] Social media posts on X reflect a growing nostalgia for the Pahlavi monarchy, with some users advocating for Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s return to restore a constitutional monarchy. [15] A 2019 Brookings Institution report highlights the revolution’s devastating strategic loss for the U.S. and the enduring discontent among Iranians under clerical rule. [13]

  • Refutation of Direct Installation: While U.S. actions—such as discouraging a military coup and engaging with Khomeini’s aides—facilitated the Shah’s fall, the revolution was driven by internal forces, including a broad coalition of clerics, intellectuals, and leftists. [5, 12] Khomeini’s charisma and organizational network, amplified by smuggled tapes of his sermons, mobilized millions. [12] The Carter administration’s reluctance to fully back the Shah stemmed from his human rights abuses and the revolution’s momentum, not a deliberate plan to install Khomeini. [10, 14] Historians like Gary Sick, a former Carter advisor, affirm the authenticity of U.S.-Khomeini contacts but deny that the U.S. abandoned the Shah outright. [11] From a Capitalist perspective, Carter’s vacillation reflects state incompetence, not a conspiracy to impose an Islamic regime. [7]

4. Do Governments Create Radical Regimes to Foster Chaos?

  • The Claim: Governments like Israel, the CIA, and the U.S. deliberately create radical regimes to perpetuate global instability. [9, 15]
  • The Refutation: This oversimplifies complex geopolitical strategies. [7] States intervene to advance their interests, often with unintended consequences, rather than to sow chaos. [7] Israel’s support for Mujama al-Islamiya aimed to undermine the PLO, not to destabilize the region, as evidenced by Segev and Cohen’s admissions. [1, 3] Similarly, Hacham’s reflection on the error underscores a miscalculation, not a deliberate plot. [7] The CIA’s actions in Cuba were driven by anti-communist objectives, not a desire for instability. [8] In Iran, U.S. engagement with Khomeini was a pragmatic attempt to manage a collapsing ally’s transition, not a scheme to install a radical regime. [10, 11] These cases illustrate the flaws of state-driven control, not a coordinated effort to create chaos. [7]

5. Did Israel Create and Fund Hamas?

  • The Claim: Israel directly created and financed Hamas, akin to the alleged CIA role with Castro or U.S. role with Khomeini. [9, 15]
  • The Refutation: This claim exaggerates the reality. Israel supported Mujama al-Islamiya’s charitable activities to counter the PLO, as Segev and Cohen acknowledged. [1, 2] When Hamas turned militant in 1987, Israel was unprepared, as Harari noted. [2] The Qatari funds permitted from 2018, approved by Netanyahu and Barnea, aimed to stabilize Gaza, though some reached Hamas’s military wing, per Hulata and Mossad assessments. [3] Hamas’s primary funding comes from Iran, Qatar, and other sources, not Israel. [6] Harari and HonestReporting on X emphasize that Israel neither armed nor directly financed Hamas. [2, 9] The Washington Post’s comparison to “Israel’s Taliban” (2006) highlights a policy misstep, not intentional creation. [7]

Analysis and Implications

The evidence indicates that Israel, potentially through Mossad, indirectly supported Mujama al-Islamiya in the 1970s and 1980s to counter the PLO, providing financial aid and permitting its expansion. [1, 2] However, there is no conclusive evidence that Mossad directly created or financed Hamas as a militant organization following its 1987 formation. [2] Hamas’s shift to violence caught Israeli authorities off guard, leading to a policy reversal by 1989. [2]

The Qatari funding arrangement from 2018, approved by Israel to stabilize Gaza, inadvertently allowed some funds to reach Hamas’s military wing, as Mossad assessments confirmed. [3] However, Hamas’s financial independence, supported by Iran, Qatar, and other sources, undermines claims of direct Israeli funding. [6] Assertions like Borrell’s that Israel “created Hamas” oversimplify the issue, conflating early missteps with Hamas’s independent growth. [3] Similarly, claims regarding Iran’s Ayatollah regime, Castro’s rise, and U.S. installation of Khomeini lack credible evidence or exaggerate state roles. [5, 8, 10] Netanyahu’s denials minimize Israel’s role, but the evidence suggests a series of strategic errors rooted in state intervention. [3, 7]

From a Capitalist perspective, these events underscore the dangers of government overreach. [7] State attempts to manipulate outcomes, whether Israel’s support for Mujama, the CIA’s anti-communist efforts, or Carter’s Iran policy, often lead to unintended consequences that markets and individuals could better address without bureaucratic interference. [7]

Conclusion

The claim that Mossad directly financed and created Hamas is not supported by evidence; rather, Israel’s early support for Mujama al-Islamiya and later tolerance of Qatari funds inadvertently contributed to Hamas’s rise. [2, 3] Similarly, allegations that Israel established Iran’s Ayatollah regime, that the CIA installed Castro, or that the U.S. deliberately installed Khomeini are baseless or overstated. [5, 8, 10] Hamas’s emergence was driven by Palestinian grievances, regional funding, and its own ideological evolution, not solely by Israeli actions. [4, 6] In Iran, U.S. engagement with Khomeini facilitated the Shah’s fall, but the revolution was a domestic movement, now regretted by many Iranians who face an oppressive regime. [5, 15] These cases highlight the pitfalls of state intervention, a core concern for Capitalists who advocate for individual liberty and market-driven solutions. [7]

For further reading, I recommend The Intercept’s 2018 analysis of Israel’s early support for Mujama al-Islamiya, The New York Times’ 2023 report on Qatari funding, The Council on Foreign Relations’ accounts of Hamas and the Iranian Revolution, and BBC News’ 2016 report on U.S.-Khomeini contacts. [2, 3, 4, 5, 10] Public discourse on X reflects varied perspectives on these issues. [9, 15] I invite readers to consider whether these events reflect deliberate state strategies or the inevitable failures of government overreach. Your thoughts are welcome below.

References:

  1. Wall Street Journal, “How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas,” 2009.
  2. The Intercept, “Blowback: How Israel Went From Helping Create Hamas to Bombing It,” 2018.
  3. The New York Times, “Israel Knew Hamas’s Money Source Years Before Attacks,” 2023.
  4. Council on Foreign Relations, “What Is Hamas?” 2023.
  5. Council on Foreign Relations, “The Iranian Revolution,” 2023.
  6. Reuters, “Hamas Funding: How the Islamist Group Sustains Itself,” 2021.
  7. The Washington Post, “How Hamas Became Israel’s Taliban,” 2006.
  8. CIA Declassified Documents, Bay of Pigs and Cuba, 1960s.
  9. X posts, accessed June 25, 2025.
  10. BBC News, “Two Weeks in January: America’s Secret Engagement with Khomeini,” 2016.
  11. The Guardian, “US Had Extensive Contact with Ayatollah Khomeini Before Iran Revolution,” 2016.
  12. Britannica, “Iranian Revolution,” 2025.
  13. Brookings Institution, “Iran’s Revolution at 40: From Theocracy to ‘Normality’?” 2019.
  14. Wikipedia, “Iranian Revolution,” 2025.
  15. X posts on Iranian regret and monarchist sentiment, accessed June 25, 2025.


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